Please refer to the attached file. A. SITUATION ANALYSIS Description of the crisis Lebanon entered 2026 facing a protracted and multidimensional crisis shaped by the cumulative effects of the financial and economic collapse that began in 2019, the consequences of successive rounds of hostilities since October 2023, large-scale population displacement, weakened public services and infrastructure, and persistent institutional and financial constraints. While the country had begun to show signs of economic stabilization and recovery during 2025, the renewed escalation of hostilities on 2 March 2026 abruptly reversed this trajectory and generated a new large-scale humanitarian emergency. The World Bank estimates that the renewed conflict derailed Lebanon’s fragile recovery and projects the economy to contract by 6. 4 per cent in 2026, further constraining household purchasing power, livelihoods, public finances and the capacity of already overstretched institutions and services to respond to humanitarian needs. The renewed escalation of hostilities on 2 March 2026 triggered large-scale displacement across Lebanon, with more than 1. 2 million people forced to flee their homes at the height of the crisis. Many displaced families sought refuge in collective shelters, including public schools and other facilities, while others stayed with host families or in temporary accommodation. By 13 April, approximately 140, 914 people were accommodated in 684 collective shelters. As the intensity of hostilities gradually decreased, displacement patterns shifted, with increasing numbers of families returning to their areas of origin and a progressive reduction in collective shelter occupancy. By 24 June, the number of people residing in collective shelters had decreased to 80, 611 across 584 sites, while 523, 249 people had returned to their communities. This trend continued over the following months, alongside the gradual closure and consolidation of collective shelters, particularly those established in public schools ahead of the new academic year. As of 29 September, IOM recorded 329, 686 internally displaced persons, including 14, 277 people in 154 collective sites, while 877, 203 people had returned to their areas of origin. Despite the substantial return movements, conditions in many affected areas remained challenging. Extensive damage to residential buildings and essential infrastructure left many households unable to return to their homes, while others returned to partially damaged properties or areas where basic services remained disrupted. Continued airstrikes and security incidents, particularly in southern Lebanon, alongside explosive ordnance risks and limited livelihood opportunities, further constrained safe and sustainable returns. Consequently, significant shelter and early recovery needs persisted among displaced and returning populations, despite the overall reduction in displacement figures. According to the Ministry of Public Health, as of 10 September 2026, 4, 383 people had been killed and 12, 406 injured since the renewed escalation began on 2 March. The crisis has unfolded alongside broader and increasingly complex population movements. Lebanon continues to host a large refugee population, while movements between Lebanon and Syria have increased amid changing conditions in both countries and wider regional instability. The 2026 Lebanon Response Plan estimates that approximately 1. 12 million displaced Syrians are living in Lebanon. Return movements to Syria have taken place alongside continued arrivals and internal movements, creating a complex protection environment involving Lebanese communities, refugees, migrants, internally displaced people and returnees. The renewed conflict has also exacerbated Lebanon’s existing food security and socioeconomic crisis. The April 2026 IPC update estimated that approximately 1. 24 million people, or 24 per cent of the analysed population, would face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and August 2026, compared with 874, 000 people between November 2025 and March 2026. By 30 September, UNICEF reported that four in five surveyed households were struggling to afford basic necessities, demonstrating the extent to which renewed conflict has compounded years of socioeconomic deterioration and depleted household coping capacities. Public services and infrastructure have also sustained significant impacts. Health facilities and ambulances have been affected by attacks, while insecurity and damage have disrupted access to health care. By June 2026, the Ministry of Public Health reported that 17 hospitals had been damaged, including three that were forced to close. Since the renewed escalation began, 133 healthcare workers had been killed and 402 injured, while 172 attacks on emergency medical service vehicles and stations had been recorded. The education sector has similarly been affected and that among 1, 089 education facilities assessed, 436 were damaged and 37 destroyed. Damage and disruption to water, sanitation, electricity, housing and other essential infrastructure have further constrained access to basic services in affected and return areas. By the end of September 2026, the situation had evolved from the peak phase of mass displacement towards a complex combination of continued humanitarian response, population return and early recovery. However, the security situation remained volatile, with ongoing attacks and airstrikes, particularly in southern Lebanon, continuing to result in casualties, damage and disruption and affecting conditions for safe and sustainable return. Significant displacement, damaged infrastructure, socioeconomic deterioration and continued hostilities therefore mean that Lebanon remains in a fragile humanitarian situation.



