81.8 F
Pakistan
Saturday, September 26, 2026
HomeBusinessProxy Wars Reality (Part-2)

Proxy Wars Reality (Part-2)

The answer is straightforward. Wars are not fought only by armies. Ports, energy routes, industries, employment and ordinary citizens also bear their costs. Is “Greater Israel” Becoming a Reality? This is another subject that requires an examination of facts rather than emotion. The term “Greater Israel” has been used in different ways by religious, historical and political movements. Some extremist and nationalist groups have advocated visions of expanded Israeli borders. But treating such visions as a settled, universally accepted or operational policy of the Israeli state would be misleading. Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia military chiefs review security threats facing KSA More importantly, drawing a territory on a map and permanently controlling that territory are two very different things. The 1967 war provides an important example. Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Yet the Sinai was subsequently returned to Egypt under the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Even today, permanently controlling a large territory requires much more than advanced aircraft, drones, missiles and technology. Governance, population, water, infrastructure, economic sustainability, local resistance and long-term political administration are fundamental challenges. Harmain al-Sharifain is our red line, says PM Shehbaz at UN The war in Gaza has also demonstrated that military superiority and a political settlement are not the same thing. A military force may inflict enormous damage on a territory, but establishing sustainable political control is a fundamentally different challenge. By September 2026, the humanitarian situation in Gaza remained severe, with a large proportion of its roughly 2. 1 million inhabitants displaced or facing shortages of essential services and other serious humanitarian difficulties. The real danger may not be the map, but the fragmentation of power. The central problem of the Middle East may not simply be whether a particular country dreams of reaching “from the Nile to the Euphrates”. Tehran proposes 7-day plan to reopen Strait of Hormuz The deeper problem is that regional states have struggled to translate their collective potential into effective power because of internal divisions, sectarian conflicts, economic dependencies, weak institutions and external intervention. Israel, on one side, enjoys strong military and political support from the United States. Iran, on the other, has expanded its regional influence through non-state armed groups. The Gulf Arab states have relied heavily on the United States, advanced weapons systems and diplomatic partnerships for their security. The result is that the traditional model of state-versus-state warfare has increasingly been supplemented—and in some cases displaced—by multi-layered conflicts involving proxies, missiles, drones, cyber operations, economic pressure and political competition. PTI postpones Islamabad long march for one week And in this entire process, ordinary people often pay the highest price. What really changed after 1979? Israel did not suddenly become invincible after 1979. Nor can it be established that Iran entered into a secret arrangement with Israel to eliminate the military power of the Arab states. But a major historical transformation did take place. The Arab-Israeli conflict ceased to be the Middle East’s only central strategic confrontation. It became intertwined with the Iran-Saudi rivalry, Shia-Sunni political competition, the US-Iran confrontation, Turkey-Arab tensions, domestic civil wars and the growing power of non-state armed groups. Security forces kill 33 Indian-sponsored terrorists in Balochistan operation: ISPR That transformation made the regional balance of power far more fragmented and complicated. If the question is whether the Arab states presented a more unified state-based front against Israel before 1979 than they did afterwards, the historical record suggests that the regional power structure became considerably more fragmented after 1979. But if the question is whether Iran is secretly protecting Israel, such a claim would require credible evidence. The available record instead shows a prolonged and intense confrontation between Iran and Israel, involving both direct attacks and proxy warfare. Perhaps this is the bitterest lesson of the Middle East’s long conflict: The problem is not only the strength of one’s adversary. It is also the fragmentation of one’s own strength. If the Arab world genuinely seeks to play an effective role in advancing Palestinian interests and protecting its broader collective interests, slogans alone will not be enough. It will require stronger state institutions, greater economic self-reliance, political stability, regional diplomacy and sustained cooperation. History also teaches us that wars are not won only on battlefields. Sometimes nations lose when they become so consumed by the urge to settle solvable political problems through force that they leave no room for negotiation. Dr Anum NazThe writer is a former Associate Professor at the Department of Mass Communi-cation, NAML University, Karachi.

Read full story on The Nation

RELATED ARTICLES

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

- Advertisment -
Google search engine

Most Popular

Recent Comments